Wednesday, June 7, 2023

Ukraine, Why, Why Now, What Next

Almost all the Russia “experts” got it wrong about the scale of the invasion and wrong that the Russians would make an incursion beyond the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk which were already under de facto Russian control. The term “expert” does not carry the same weight today as before, I will avoid that label and simply state, I have over sixty years experience dealing with Russia and Russians as an intelligence officer, an entrepreneur running an international high-tech company in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 (employed 100+ top notch Russian scientists), and as an academic teaching intelligence analysis at Henley-Putnam University.

Most analysts do understand the “Why” for the invasion. Countries and societies are prisoners of their history. History cannot repeat, but history will mimic. The “Why” for the 2022 Russian invasion of the Ukraine extends back in history, predating the Soviet Union by almost 1000 years. During that millennia, Russia suffered major invasions by the Byzantine Empire, France, Germany, Lithuania, Japan, Mongols, Persia, Poland, Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Sweden, the Vikings, among others, including the US and United Kingdom interfering in the 1917-1923 Russian civil war. The Cold War placed the US and the Soviet Union with the dire threat of annihilating each other in a strategic nuclear weapon exchange (known as Mutual Assured Destruction). In addition, from the Russian view, NATO poses a new military threat to Russia.

Russia earned their paranoia after hundreds of years of foreign invasions. Thus, one strategic imperative for Russia was a buffer zone which gave the Russians strategic depth from incursions from the west. The Warsaw Pact, the Russian counter to NATO, gave the Kremlin that strategic buffer. During the Cold War, the Russians ruthlessly put down any efforts by the Warsaw Pact states who deviated from perceived Russian interests. This included Russian military actions in East Germany (1953), the invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), and suppressing dissent in the Baltic states throughout the Cold War.

WHY INVADE NOW? Russia views the Ukraine as part of a historic buffer protecting the core of Russian territory from enemies attacking from the west. This buffer concept is an ingrained security belief that drives Russian strategic thought. The key word is ‘belief’. We believe Russia poses a threat to the US and Europe. Russia believes the US and NATO are threats to Russia. Beliefs do not have to be rational, a challenge for analysts attempting to understand a political or military situation. Russia ‘believed the Ukraine was moving toward joining NATO and the EU. Russia would be more exposed and vulnerable. In the current Ukraine ‘situation’ there are ample precedents about Russian ‘strategic beliefs’ and the extent Russia would go to ensure they maximize the territorial security of Russia.

Russia experienced a weak reaction from the west when Russia moved against Georgia in 2008, carving out the self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as Russian clients. A similar move into the Crimea and the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 indicated the west would talk but not risk direct military action to defend the integrity of the Ukraine. Russia may have fooled President Biden’s security team. As masters of deception, the Russians may have decided to leak information that Russia would invade the Ukraine. Russia moved troops up to the Ukraine borders and began military exercises which looked very similar to the deception used prior to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The US dutifully publicly announced we had the ‘intelligence’ that Russia was about to invade the Ukraine. Then the US publicly told Russia that no US troops would be deployed into the Ukraine for combat operations to protect the Ukraine. Russia now had the information they wanted on US intentions. Game on, launch the invasion.

 

WHAT NEXT: A US military saying goes – when the shooting starts the original plan goes out the window. Clausewitz stated this in a more elegant manner as, “the fog of war’. The Clausewitz allusion to the uncertainties inherent in every conflict. While the run-up to the invasion was masterful, the actual execution was poor in the sense the Russians miscalculated several factors. It appears the Russians expected a quick victory, 2-4 days, and wanted to minimize civilian casualties. The initial bombardment by rockets, artillery, and aircraft fell far short of the intensity needed for a shock and awe blitzkrieg assault. The initial Russian invasion force was only about one-third of the troops deployed on the Ukraine borders. The Ukraine military resisted more effectively than expected. Russia had to bring in reinforcements. Furthermore, Russia faces a serious set of sanctions which are damaging the Russian economy.

On the military side, Russia has the combat capability to conquer the Ukraine. However, Russia does not want to be an occupying power against a hostile population.

Now we come back to the “fog of war”. It is relatively easy to give context to a strategic event as done above, however, going into the forecast, uncertainty reigns supreme. With that in mind, here are thoughts about the future impacts of the Russian invasion.

The great uncertainty is how “wise” the political elites will be on each side.

Russia is in a position where it is virtually impossible to back away from the aggressive stance they have taken. The political goal is likely to be installing a regime in Kiev which is friendly to Russian interests.

How much economic punishment does the US and Europe plan to inflict on Russia, and, for how long? The economic blowback will negatively impact the US and world economies as well as Russia. Russia and the Ukraine are major exporters of food (corn, wheat, barley, rye, eggs), energy (oil, natural gas), ammonia for fertilizer production, metals (copper, nickel, titanium, aluminum, neon (essential microchip manufacturing), and specialized chemicals. Worldwide inflation is increasing and the potential looms to cause a global economic depression in the near term. The western political elites must watch the break point where the sanctions hurt the west as much or more than they hurt Russia.

The big geostrategic winner in a drawn out new Cold War will be China.

The greatest risk to the US is a miscalculation that results in an uncontrolled escalation to the threshold of nuclear war. The US and Russia each have the nuclear weapon capabilities to totally destroy each other. Open source literature gives Russia a nuclear weapon inventory on the order of 4477 to 6257 weapons; the same literature gives the US a nuclear weapon inventory of 3800 to 5428 weapons. International treaty limitations state 1550 -1800 weapons may be deployed at one time by each nation. Even the smaller number of treaty-allowed deployed weapons by each nation is sufficient for Russia to obliterate the US as a society and nation and the US to annihilate Russia as a society and nation. This catastrophic mutual destruction could be done in about one hour’s time from the first missile launches.

Neither the US nor Russia has an effective anti-missile defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The problem of miscalculation by the political leadership of Russia or the US is our greatest risk.

Originally Published 07.03.2022. Re-published with Permission from www.GaryBowser.net.

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