Intelligence and Polities, Knowledge is Power

When I began the website initiative, Thought for the Week, I intended to avoid the trap of falling into a purely political discussion. This site is about intelligence. My books are telling about intelligence in the real world. (I intend to talk more next month about the ‘why’ I began a series of books which I refer to as the True Believer series.) I realized that I was out of step with two of the greatest thinkers in history who wrote about war, General Karl von Clausewitz and General Sun Tzu.

The reality is – Intelligence is part of the DNA of politics and Intelligence is the essence of success in war.

Clausewitz, “war is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means,” (On War)

“By the word “information” we denote all the knowledge which we have of the enemy and his country; therefore, in fact, the foundation of all our ideas and actions.” (On War)

“It is more important to out-think your enemy than to outfight him” – Sun Tzu

“The opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.” – Sun Tzu

“If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” – Sun Tzu

Clausewitz tended to be more cautious than Sun Tzu about the role of intelligence. Clausewitz understood the importance of information but was concerned about the ever present risks of deception, incorrect information, and incomplete information. Sun Tzu was an enthusiastic promoter of information (intelligence) as the very key to success in warfare. Sun Tzu argued that done properly, intelligence can allow one to win the war without direct fighting. I observe the basic truth that risk is part of life and no where is risk and success so closely joined as in warfare.

We have many examples in history how intelligence was the “reason” for victory and examples where bad intelligence was the “reason” for disaster. We noted in a previous thought that the intelligence from GRU Colonel Penkovsky enabled the US to avoid a nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis and deal the Soviet Union a potent political defeat. Eli Cohen was under deep cover in Syria as an Israeli Mossad agent. Cohen provided critical information about Syrian defenses in the Golan Heights. This intelligence allowed Israel to defeat the strongly entrenched Syrian military and saved Israeli military lives in the 1967 War. Israel had good intelligence prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War but succumbed to the Egyptian deception. In addition, Israel had insufficient intelligence on the evolution of Arab air defenses based on Soviet technology. These two factors resulted in early disasters for Israel in the 1973 War and brought Israel to the brink of being annihilated as a country and a people. Stalin ignored the intelligence that Nazi Germany had massed over 150 divisions in June 1941 to invade the Soviet Union. Timely intelligence for the GRU agent Richard Sorge helped the Soviets redeploy troops from the Far East to defeat the Nazis at the gates of Moscow and turn the tide of the war.

All this brings us full circle back to the premise that politicians make the decisions to go to war or not. These political decisions are complex and often are driven by ideology rather than cold objective reason. The key task for intelligence is to ‘live in the enemy’s mind’. I mean this in two contexts. First, understand what ‘drives’ the enemy behavior. Second, what are the potential consequences to your political decision.

Role play is a powerful tool for training intelligence operatives and analysts. For this week, I would like you to assume two different roles as you think about the following strategic challenges. Your first role is a member of the National Security council. Your second role is a General Officer and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In each role, what advice do you give the President? (Action to take; possible consequences of the action) Treat each incident as a separate event. Did you apply a different frame of reference for each analysis or have a consistent protocol for your recommendation?

India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons and have been enemies since the two nations were formed after WWII. They have been involved in low level conflicts and had several wars since 1947. Religious differences and geographic disputes, primarily Kashmir, are the root causes for their continuing conflict. Intelligence indicates both sides are moving into a new war and each is preparing a preemptive nuclear strike.

The Russians use a small tactical nuclear weapon to eliminate a concentration of Ukrainian forces.

Iran is on full alert and intelligence indicates they are going to launch a nuclear weapon at Tel Aviv.

You cannot offer the President platitudes. You must give the President recommended “actions”.

You have your homework assignment for the week. We would be interested in seeing your inputs to the President if you would like to share with our readers.

Originally Published 25.04.2022. Re-published with Permission from www.GaryBowser.net.

LIFE Should Be a Continuous Learning Experience

 

We are in the third week of the new initiative to share perceptions and ideas on current events of critical importance to the security of our country. I reflected on the reason I started the Thought for the Week. My intent was to challenge each of you to think “critically” about these events. I mean for you to not think as a “critic’, but think as an analyst. I do not hold with critics who only find fault and offer nothing positive. Teddy Roosevelt eloquently provided me with a perspective of ‘the critic’:

“It is not the critic who counts: not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes up short again and again, because there is no effort without error or shortcoming, but who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, who spends himself for a worthy cause; who, at the best, knows, in the end, the triumph of high achievement, and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who knew neither victory nor defeat.”

Theodore Roosevelt

The strategic analyst must think in terms of “realpolitik”, that is, the environment of events.

Realpolitik – a system of politics or principles based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations.

The idea of subjugating moral considerations may be repugnant to some readers. However, we live in a harsh world where the moral principles vary from person to person and country to country. The analyst has to think with his or her mind, not the heart. An arduous task as each of us has internal biases and core beliefs. The analyst has to be objective, systematic, and keep emotions out of the analytic process. The analyst deals with incomplete information, information that may be inaccurate, or even designed to be deceptive. The analyst mission is to give the most accurate understanding of the issue, not one which fits a ‘narrative’ or politically convenient answer. Good analysts are seldom popular. So, my challenge to you, put on your analyst hat each week and delve deeply into the issue for that week. Think within a framework that requires intellectual discipline. This may give you conclusions which surprise you, or maybe not.

The theme for this week is about war and policy and decisions.

“Lesson learned” is a process for the military to prepare for the ‘next war’ by studying the past.

But – learning the “correct lessons” has not been easy based on the history of warfare.

Moreover, the focus on war often omits how a war actually happens. Politicians make the decisions to engage in war. The military fights the war that the politicians begin. Of course, the military and the intelligence community have significant inputs to the politicians making the decision to go to war. In the evolving events in and around the Ukraine today, Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden will make decisions which will direct the evolution of the fighting and history. Of paramount importance, Putin has a finger on the trigger to launch Russian nuclear weapons. As a ‘good analyst’ you must also note, Joe Biden has a finger on the trigger to launch American nuclear weapons. The ongoing war in the Ukraine presents the possibility that a miscalculation by one of the many involved parties could lead to a catastrophic nuclear war.

Have the politicians on both sides learned the “correct lessons”?

History suggests they have not.

We nearly stumbled into a nuclear war with the Soviet Union on three occasions during the Cold War.

The politicians failed our country miserably in the Vietnam War and again in Afghanistan.

US missile deployments in Europe during the early 1960s led the Soviets to take a risky gamble to deploy nuclear weapon-capable missiles in Cuba. The result was, two nations looked into the nuclear abyss of mutual annihilation. A US military exercise in the 1980s, Able Archer, was misinterpreted by Soviet intelligence as US preparations to launch a nuclear first strike on the Soviet Union. Miscalculations that bought the opposing nuclear forces to launch readiness, waiting for the coded message to fire their missiles.

We gradually morphed into the Vietnam War starting with our support of the French in the 1950s and then fearing the ‘domino effect’ of a communist takeover of Southeast Asia. The politicians made two monumental errors, underestimating our foe and no “end game’ for the conflict. Foremost, we failed to head the admonition of the strategic thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote this maxim:

“War is a trial of moral and physical forces by means of the latter. . . In the last analysis it is at moral, not physical strength that all military action is directed … Moral factors, then, are the ultimate determinants in war.”                                         

We failed to understand that North Vietnamese were fighting for their core belief of Vietnamese nationalism, though the historic evidence was there going back to the 1920s. We did not perceive the North Vietnamese would be totally resolute and committed to their cause. Beyond that, we had no ‘end game’ for the conflict except to escalate the fighting with more troops and weapons. 

In Afghanistan, we repeated the Vietnam debacle with minor variations. We had no ‘end game’, and it took us 20 years to figure that out. Our opponents were fighting for their religious and nationalistic beliefs.

In both examples our military fought valiantly and served with honor. If it appears that I have been harsh with politicians, you broke the code. My military bias is showing. Politicians talk, the military die.

The Ukraine conflict has brought us to another strategic crossroads – how do we avoid the miscalculation which leads the conflict to the point where we and the Russians will use nuclear weapons. A conflict where both sides become inevitable losers.

The White House appears to have no ‘end game’.

Please tune-in next week as the ‘lessons learned’ theme goes on looking back (1973 Yom Kippur War), examining where we are now in the geostrategic sphere, and for the future, what seems to be the strategic trajectory – toward an unpredictable war or to an unstable peace.

 

Originally Published 18.03.2022. Re-published with Permission from www.GaryBowser.net.